Eighteen Million Cracks : Gender\u27s Role in the 2008 Presidential Campaign by Parks, Gregory S. & Roberson, Quinette M.
William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 3
"Eighteen Million Cracks": Gender's Role in the
2008 Presidential Campaign
Gregory S. Parks
Quinette M. Roberson
Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Gregory S. Parks and Quinette M. Roberson, "Eighteen Million Cracks": Gender's Role in the 2008
Presidential Campaign, 17 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 321 (2011), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmjowl/vol17/iss2/3
“EIGHTEEN MILLION CRACKS”: GENDER’S ROLE IN THE
2008 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
GREGORY S. PARKS*
QUINETTA M. ROBERSON**
ABSTRACT
In light of the 2008 presidential campaign, Gregory S. Parks
and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski wrote an extensive analysis, titled A Better
Metric, likening the campaign to an interview process and hiring
decision for a high-ranking job. Though unpublished, their work
spawned a number of published articles, book chapters, and a book
on the role of unconscious race and gender bias in the evaluations of
President Barack Obama, First Lady Michelle Obama, and Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton. In light of the analogy between voting and
hiring decisions, this article argues that questions about sexism and
gender bias along the campaign trail implicate the law. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from gender bias in
the workplace. While modern conceptions of how such bias actually
operates, largely drawn from social and cognitive psychology, should
aid legal decision-makers in determining whether bias indeed occurred
in any particular case, greater insight into the intersection of psychol-
ogy and the law is needed. Here, we explore the roles that sexism and
implicit, or unconscious, gender bias played in the 2008 presidential
race, analyzing these factors through the lens of Title VII. Further, we
buttress the proposition put forth by a growing body of legal scholars
that the role of implicit attitudes in decision-making has significant
implications for Title VII jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
As a chief executive, commander-in-chief, foreign policy director
and legislative leader, the President of the United States has a
complex and challenging job. Yet despite the positional power and
authority associated with the job, it is a job nonetheless.1 Accordingly,
presidential elections can be likened to an employment context. When
U.S. citizens vote for a presidential candidate they attempt to eval-
uate who would be the best person for the job. Like employers, the
American people are tasked with hiring (electing), promoting (re-
electing), and—through their representatives—firing (impeaching
and removing) job incumbents. Like employees, candidates are chal-
lenged to demonstrate their qualifications for, interest in, and fit to
the position. Overall both sides strive to achieve an optimal fit be-
tween a job candidate and a position.
According to political theorists, voters select candidates who sup-
port and implement policies they favor.2 More specifically, based on
psychological theories of similarity and attraction,3 voter preferences
are posited to be for candidates who match their attitudes toward
certain policies. The results of research on voting behavior, however,
tell a somewhat different story as voters’ candidate preferences have
been shown to correlate with individual perceptions of candidates’
traits, and emotional reactions to the candidates themselves.4 As is
1. Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election ‘08, and the
Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 659, 676-77, 686, 701 (2010); Gregory
S. Parks et al., Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210, 215 (2009), available at http://www
.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=20; Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson,
Michelle Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through
the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3-4 (2009); see also Jim Acosta et al.,
Clinton: ‘Think About This as a Hiring Decision,’ CNN.COM, May 18, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/ 2008/POLITICS/05/18/campaign.wrap/index.html (referring to the
U.S. presidency as a job and the race for it as a job interview).
2. See J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 174 (1979) (describing
different motivations of voters).
3. See DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM 247-50 (1971) (discussing how simi-
larity and attraction might apply in the context of candidates and voters).
4. Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Public Opinion and Political Action, in 2
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true in employers’ hiring decisions,5 subjective factors influence indi-
vidual assessments regarding who is the “best person” for the job.
The 2008 presidential race provides a useful context in which to
explore gender perceptions and attitudes, specifically how those factors
influenced voting behavior during Hillary Clinton’s presidential run.6
If citizens held certain perceptions of Clinton’s abilities relative to
those needed to be an effective president or had emotional reactions
to her and her candidacy, then it is reasonable to envisage that such
factors influenced citizens’ behavior as voters. Furthermore, if elec-
tions and hiring decisions are analogous, implicit attitudes research
sheds light on gender discrimination in the employment context. As
such, contemporary Title VII scholarship and certain aspects of the
2008 presidential election may reciprocally illuminate one another.
By likening the 2008 presidential election to personnel selec-
tion, we consider broadly whether Clinton would have a viable claim
against the American people for sex-based employment discrimina-
tion under Title VII. Specifically, this article provides three parallels:
1) the role of gender in politics; 2) the role of gender under Title VII;
and 3) the distinction between conscious/explicit and unconscious/
implicit gender biases and their roles within politics and employment
discrimination law. Part I of this article discusses women’s political
participation as both voters and candidates and reflects on the role of
sexism in these political processes. Part II draws upon political sci-
ence research to investigate voting behavior in elections with female
candidates, and considers the potential role of sexism and gender bias
in Clinton’s campaign. Part III further explores unconscious gender
biases and their influence on employment discrimination and ex-
trapolates from jurisprudence in this area to make inferences about
whether Clinton could file a successful Title VII claim for implicit
gender bias in her quest to become President of the United States.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF SEXISM ON WOMEN’S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION AND POWER
As discussed in Parks and Rachlinski’s A Better Metric, women
have long been disenfranchised in the political arena.7 Dating as far
back as the late 1700s, few women—and ultimately only free white
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 690, 690-91 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds.,
Random House 3d ed. 1985).
5. Paul R. Sackett & Filip Lievens, Personnel Selection, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 419,
429-30 (2008).
6. Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of Unconscious
Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 Presidential Race 32-33, 35-38 (Cornell Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-007, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1102704.
7. Id.
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men—were allowed to vote.8 When it came time to agitate for women’s
right to vote, it was not the major political parties of the day that
fought for women.9 Rather, it was middle- and upper-class women.10
After Congress ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, southern white
men opposed female suffrage out of fear that it would increase the
number of black voters.11 Opponents also argued that voting “was
not a right but [rather] a privilege,” and that women were virtually
represented by men.12
During its evolution, “[t]he women’s suffrage movement witnessed
three stages.”13 The first stage began in 1848 when the Women’s
Rights Convention, with an emphasis on political rights, adopted its
declaration.14 During the second stage, which was bolstered by the
Civil War, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony led the
Women’s National Loyalty League, which “backed Senator [Charles]
Sumner’s insistence that the [Civil W]ar be a battle for . . . universal
emancipation.”15 When Congress refused to send the states an amend-
ment, analogous to the Fifteenth Amendment but in respect to gender
and voting, suffrage leaders focused on the Fourteenth Amendment,
which they believed protected a woman’s right to vote.16 During the
final stage, in and around 1869, women founded the National Woman
Suffrage Association—to pressure Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment that would enfranchise women—and the American
Woman Suffrage Association, which focused its efforts on constitu-
tional conventions and state legislatures.17 In 1890, these organiza-
tions combined, forming the National American Woman Suffrage
Association (NAWSA).18 It was due to the efforts of NAWSA and
other women’s organizations that Congress ratified the Nineteenth
Amendment, which gave women the right to vote.19
8. Id. at 6 (citing DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 117-18 (2004)).
9. Id. (citing DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 119 (2004)).
10. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
UNDER THE LAW 120 (2004).
11. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 7 (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 117-
22).
12. Id. (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 121).
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 125-27).
15. STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 127.
16. Id. at 129.
17. Id. at 131-32.
18. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 7 (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 125,
131-33).
19. Id. at 7 (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 125-33, 182).
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The efforts of women suffragists had a slow but critical impact
on women’s political power in the United States. From 1917—when
the first woman joined Congress20—until the early 1990s, few women
were elected to Congress.21 In 1993, however, women nearly doubled
their congressional ranks from thirty-four to fifty-five.22 As of the
110th Congress (2007-2009), the number stood at ninety-four,23 which
shows that gender still matters to voters, including women, who
comprise fifty-four percent of the electorate.24 It is the change in law,
but far slower change in a potential outcome of the law, which under-
scores the potential that individual attitudes have to effectuate change
in human behavior. The point being, “the law can only truly make a
difference if underlying discriminatory attitudes change as well.” 25
II. COULD HILLARY CLINTON FILE A SUCCESSFUL TITLE VII CLAIM
FOR EXPLICIT SEXISM?
It is no surprise that a political candidate’s gender has long
predicted electability.26 This article argues that politics is analogous
to the employment context. In both, an individual is presumably seek-
ing a position, often in competition with others, and is at the mercy of
those who must decide to elect (in the political context) or hire (in the
employment context) that individual.27 If such an analogy is apropos,
then Title VII is instructive in how one might examine the 2008 presi-
dential election—under Title VII, employers may not discriminate
because of an applicant’s sex.28 In its Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
20. I’m No Lady, I’m a Woman of Congress: Women Pioneers on Capital Hill, 1917-
1934, WOMEN IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-essays/essay
.html?intID=2 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
21. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 7.
22. Women Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1917-Present: 102nd Congress,
WOMEN IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives
-senators-by-congress.html?congress=102 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011); Women Representa-
tives and Senators by Congress, 1917-Present: 103rd Congress, WOMEN IN CONGRESS,
http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives-senators-by-
congress.html?congress=103 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
23. Women Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1917-Present: 110th Congress,
WOMEN IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives
-senators-by-congress.html?congress=110 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
24. See Kathleen Q. Seelye & Dalia Sussman, Clinton Has Support of Women But Faces
Skepticism, Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at A1 (noting that fifty-four percent of the
electorate was female in 2007).
25. Laura Bacon, Note, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice
for Housing Choice Voucher Holders, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2006).
26. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 32-33.
27. See Jim Acosta et al., supra note 1 (likening Clinton’s presidential campaign to a
traditional hiring decision).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
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decision, the Supreme Court clarified what constitutes sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII.29 “[W]hen a plaintiff . . . proves that her gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid . . . liability only by proving . . . it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into
account.” 30 In deciding Price Waterhouse, the Court looked to gender-
stereotyping language used by company partners and representatives
during their partnership selection process.31
An expert witness, psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske, “testified at
trial that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was
likely influenced by sex stereotyping.” 32 Dr. Fiske predicated her
analysis on “the overtly sex-based comments of partners” and their
“gender-neutral remarks” that “were intensely critical of [plaintiff-
respondent].” 33 According to Dr. Fiske, given that plaintiff-respondent
was “the only woman in the pool of candidates” 34 and the evaluations’
subjectivity, the highly critical remarks were probative of gender
bias.35 The Supreme Court found that in previous years when evalu-
ating partner candidates at Price Waterhouse, partners favored those
who maintained their femininity over those who did not.36
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that sex-stereotyped remarks
in the employment context are not automatic proof of gender discrimi-
nation.37 Where, however, the employee demonstrates that the em-
ployer relied on gender in making its decision, stereotyped remarks
can be “evidence that gender played a part” in the hiring decision.38
It also placed the burden on the employer to show that it had a legiti-
mate reason for an employment decision where there is both a pos-
sible legitimate and discriminatory motive.39
A. Sexism and the Electability of Women Candidates
As Parks and Rachlinski have noted, “sex-role stereotyping . . .
has hampered women’s ability to be considered as serious candidates
for elected office.” 40 This is in part due to gender stereotyping, which
29. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 235.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 236.
35. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 258.
38. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 252. “The employer . . . must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone,
would have induced it to make the same decision.” Id.
40. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 32 (citing KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR
WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN CANDIDATES 8-9, 59-67 (2004)).
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continues to pervade American electoral politics.41 Even beyond voter
behavior, women’s lack of traction as political candidates also has
to do with political parties’ gate-keeping activities, as party leaders
are aware of gender stereotypes and the electoral chances of women
vis-à-vis men.42 It is not only men whose voting decisions are influ-
enced by gender; women’s are as well, with women supporting female
candidates more than male candidates.43 While there is evidence of the
influence of gender on voting behavior, the political outcomes of such
gender effects have been mixed. For example, research shows that
once on the ballot, women have been as successful as men at gaining
elected office.44 In addition, reviews of U.S. House of Representatives
elections revealed no significant differences in the success of male
versus female candidates.45 One conclusion might be that the role of
sexism in political processes has substantially diminished in recent
years. The results of research on sexism and the electability of female
candidates may also reflect the types of positions for which women
have primarily run. Because few women have pursued a major-party
presidential nomination,46 we have little insight into the effects of
41. Id. (citing RICHARD LOGAN FOX, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
173-75 (1997); Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attribution
of Leadership Traits, 46 POL. RES. Q. 527 (1993); David Niven, Party Elites and Women
Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57 (1998); Kira Sanbonmatsu, Gender
Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20, 28-30 (2002)). For example, women can-
didates who demonstrate stereotypically female characteristics are at a disadvantage, par-
ticularly in terms of male voters. Leonie Huddy & Nayda Terkildsen, The Consequences
of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office, 46
POL. RES. Q. 503, 517-18 (1993). Moreover, when contemplating who to elect for President,
voters who view terrorism, homeland security, and U.S. involvement in Iraq as the most
important problems facing the U.S. believe that a man will do a better job of handling such
issues. Erika Falk & Kate Kenski, Issue Saliency and Gender Stereotypes: Support for
Women as Presidents in Times of War and Terrorism, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1, 12 (2006).
42. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 33 (citing KIRA SANBONMATSU, WHERE WOMEN
RUN: GENDER & PARTY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 2-3, 22, 26-30, 37-86, 97-115, 118 (2006)).
43. Id. at 33 (citing KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC
EVALUATES WOMEN CANDIDATES 92, 101 (2004); Craig Leonard Brians, Women for
Women?: Gender and Party Bias in Voting for Female Candidates, 33 AM. POL. RES. 357,
359 (2005); Paul S. Herrnson et al., Women Running “as Women”: Candidate’s Gender,
Campaign Issues, and Voter Targeting Strategies, 65 J. POL. 244, 249-50 (2003); Eric
Plutzer & John F. Zipp, Identity Politics, Partisanship, and Voting for Women Candidates,
60 PUB. OPINION Q. 30, 40 (1996)).
44. Leonie Huddy & Theresa Capelos, Gender Stereotyping and Candidate Evaluation:
Good News and Bad News for Women Politicians, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS
29, 30 (Victor C. Ottati et al. eds., 2002).
45. RICHARD A. SELTZER ET AL., SEX AS A POLITICAL VARIABLE: WOMEN AS CANDIDATES
AND VOTERS IN U.S. ELECTIONS 79, 82-83 (1997); Alice H. Eagly et al., Experimental Tests
of an Attitudinal Theory of the Gender Gap in Voting, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL., 1245, 1256 (2003).
46. Sean Alfano, The Quest to Become Ms. President: Female Politicians Discuss the
Prospects of a Woman Leader, CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 5, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2006/02/05/Sunday/main1281736.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
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sexism on female candidates’ qualifications for, and ability to succeed
in, the position of President of the United States. Further, because
gender may play a stronger role when determining a person’s fitness
for specific roles,47 consideration of the relationship between gender
and electability at higher levels is needed. Research suggests that men
are favored over women when vying for authority positions, such as
military officerships, given that such positions tend to be traditionally
occupied by male incumbents and therefore are male-dominated.48
“Individuals may be comforted by male leadership for the simple fact
that they are accustomed to viewing men as authority figures and
women as subordinates.” 49 Therefore, in examining the 2008 presi-
dential race, there are factors that suggest that Clinton would have
a case against the American people for sex-based employment dis-
crimination if the race had been a job interview.
B. Sexism and the Clinton Campaign
Hillary Clinton first entered national consciousness in 1992 after
her husband, Bill Clinton, became a candidate for the Democratic
Party’s presidential nomination.50 After President Clinton won the
nomination and the election, and subsequently assumed office, Mrs.
Clinton was a trailblazer and an unconventional First Lady in many
ways—becoming the first to (1) hold a post-graduate degree and pro-
fessional career, (2) have an office in the West Wing of the White
House, and (3) be a visible policy-maker in her husband’s administra-
tion.51 “Hillary Clinton was arguably the most openly empowered First
Lady in American history, save perhaps for Eleanor Roosevelt.” 52
Although she was a polarizing figure in American politics for nearly
a decade and a half,53 she was enormously popular in New York,
47. See Eugenia Proctor Gerdes & Jane Hutson Kelman, Sex Discrimination: Effects
of Sex-Role Incongruence, Evaluator Sex, and Stereotypes, 2 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 219, 224 (1981) (explaining study results indicating that evaluators are influ-
enced by traditional sex roles as well as the gender of candidates).
48. Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111
PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 7 (1992); Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit and
Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1315, 1325 (2000).
49. Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1325.
50. John F. Harris & Ann Devroy, Her Way Versus the Washington Way: Ambition and
Suspicion in the First Year Are Redounding on Hillary Rodham Clinton, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 1996, at A1.
51. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 34 (citing Christopher Hanson, Clinton
Invites the People In: President Opens the White House to Ordinary Citizens, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 22, 1993, at A1; Harris & Devroy, supra note 51, at A1; Jasmin
K. Williams, Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y. POST, Oct. 30, 2006, at 28).
52. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 34.
53. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Who Is More Electable?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A31
(noting fear that Clinton’s political history—since her husband’s 1992 election—would keep
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winning a landslide U.S. Senate re-election in 2006.54 Clinton’s 2008
presidential run put to the test Americans’ willingness to elect a
woman as president, and poll data boded well for her candidacy.55
Calling into question her candidacy was, in part, the result of an
immense dislike of her held by many political conservatives.56 Part of
their animus likely stemmed from the fact that Clinton was deemed
to be “polarizing.” 57 It may have also resulted from an attitude among
some that Clinton failed to conform to or respect normative wife-and-
mother behavior.58 For example, Clinton is famous for noting that,
as First Lady, she did not want to “stay at home, bake cookies and
give teas.” 59
Accordingly, while poll data should have provided the Clinton
campaign with signs of optimism, it should have also been foreboding.
On one hand, some women voters paid more attention to the presi-
dential race and were more likely to vote because of Clinton’s candi-
dacy.60 While 80% of Americans told Gallup pollsters in a November
2007 poll that they expected female voters to be the deciding factor in
Clinton’s election to the presidency, 77% of women polled reported
that they had not made up their minds.61 On the other hand, polls
her from winning votes).
54. Patrick Healy, In a Field of Heavy Hitters No Sure Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2007, at 27.
55. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 35 (describing polling data that was favor-
able for Clinton) (citing Bonnie Erbe Scripps, Will Women Vote for Women?, DESERT NEWS,
Jan. 28, 2007, at G04; Andrea Sarvaday Feldhahn, Does Sen. Hillary Clinton’s Gender Hurt
Her Chances to be Elected President?, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 2007, at 79).
Moreover, in a general election match-up with then-leading GOP contender Rudy Giuliani,
Clinton’s lead was partially credited to women voters. Alex Spillius, Hillary Drawing
Increasing Support from Women in Blow to Giuliani, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 2, 2007, at
21. Furthermore, while women held more positive views of “all of the leading Democratic
candidates” than did men, “winning the support of women . . . [was] especially important
to Mrs. Clinton,” because women constituted fifty-four percent of voters in the 2004 presi-
dential election. Seelye & Sussman, supra note 24, at A1.
56. Marianne Means, Hillary Clinton is Battle-Ready, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 21, 2007, at G4.
57. Id.
58. Carol Marin, Michelle Obama Standing by Her Man, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 20,
2008, at 25.
59. Id.
60. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 36. In a Lifetime Networks poll during the
2008 campaign, twenty percent of women “said they were more likely to vote because
Senator Clinton [was] running.” Id. (citing Ann McFeatters, Just How Strong is Hillary
Clinton’s Sisterhood?, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Nov. 12, 2007, at YY). Twenty-five
percent of women noted that they paid more attention to campaign news “simply because
[Clinton was] running.” Id.
61. Ann McFeatters, Just How Strong is Hillary Clinton’s Sisterhood?, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, Nov. 12, 2007, at YY.
330 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:321
consistently revealed a “gender gap, even among Democratic voters,”
with Clinton receiving less support from men than from women.62
As Parks and Rachlinski articulated, Clinton’s response to a
question raised in a New Hampshire diner63 demonstrated how gender
role perceptions might influence voter attitudes. Clinton’s teary-eyed
response to a concerned voter’s question in regard to how Clinton
managed to keep pace during the long primary season,64 “might have
signaled a kind of kinship” between her and her female supporters.65
This is no surprise. Even though overt emotional displays by women
risk playing into the stereotype that they lack the toughness to handle
difficult situations,66 Clinton’s expressiveness might have worked—
winning her New Hampshire precisely because it helped her connect
even more with women voters.67
While views regarding gender roles may have negatively influ-
enced some voter perceptions of Clinton’s electability, such views may
have also had concurrent positive effects. Consistent with former
President Clinton’s announcement during his first run for the presi-
dency, then-Senator Clinton may have allayed some concerns among
voters with her two-for-the-price-of-one proposal.68 In a June 3, 2007
CNN debate, she said her husband would serve in a roving ambas-
sador’s role during her administration.69 Although there was concern
among some Americans about having her husband’s influence back
62. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 37. In a July 2007 poll of likely Democratic
caucus-goers, conducted by the University of Iowa, “Clinton had 30 percent support among
women and only 18 percent among men.” Matt Stearns, Campaign 2008; Clinton Failing
to Make Inroads with Male Voters: Democrats’ Lead Candidate Fighting Wide Gender Gap,
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2007, at A4; see also Jerry Zremski, New Women Voters Could Put
Clinton in the White House; The Gender Card May Be Her Edge, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov.
25, 2007, at A1 (reporting that a Zogby International poll indicated that Senator Clinton’s
lead over Senator Obama in November “was entirely due to her support from women”). In
contrast, Obama received twenty-one percent equally from men and women. Stearns,
supra note 62, at A4. In the same poll, thirty percent of women strongly indicated that
Clinton was the strongest Democratic candidate; nearly half that percentage of men felt
similarly. Id. Thirty-two percent of women strongly believed that Clinton was electable,
while less than half of that percentage of men felt similarly. Id.
63. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 38.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Chris Rovzar & Jessica Pressler, Hillary Clinton: Minority Candidate,
DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 9, 2008, 3:15PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/01/hillary
_clinton_minority_candi.html?imw=Y).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Michael Fauntroy, Don’t Overplay the Bradley Effect, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-fauntroy-phd/dont-overplay-the
-bradl_b_80810.html).
68. David Broder, What of a Dual Presidency if Hillary Clinton Wins?, KAN. CITY STAR,
Nov. 19, 2007, at B9.
69. Robin Toner & Jeff Zeleny, Iraq is the Flash Point as Eight Democratic Rivals
Clash, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at A14.
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in the executive office, male voters may have felt sufficiently at ease
with a male presence in the White House to vote for her.70
Within the traditional Title VII paradigm, Clinton appeared to
experience sex discrimination. First, popular T-shirts and bumper
stickers were sold in reference to Clinton with phrases like “Bros
Before Hoes,” 71 “How Do We Beat the Bitch,” 72 and “Life’s a Bitch:
Don’t Vote For One!” 73 Actor and rapper Ludacris, a candid Obama
supporter, called Clinton a “bitch” in a 2008-released song—prompting
a rebuke from Obama.74 In the employment context, women who are
subjected to vulgar and offensive epithets like “whore” and “bitch” can
establish a sexual harassment claim, even if gender-neutral reasons
motivated the abuse.75 Clinton’s campaign was also subject to a num-
ber of gender-role-based remarks. For example, when she campaigned
at a New Hampshire high school a man yelled from the audience,
“Iron my shirt!” 76 There were also T-shirts and bumper stickers with
a silhouette of a woman vacuuming and the phrase “Hillary ‘08”
depicted on them.77 Arguably, such statements and images are mere
isolated remarks which provide little useful insight into the perva-
siveness of gender-biased attitudes. Nonetheless, gender stereotyp-
ing is evidence of sex discrimination in the workplace,78 particularly
where women are defined by domestic roles.79 However, in employ-
ment discrimination cases where plaintiffs—in order to demonstrate
70. Camille Paglia, She Won’t Go Easy, SALON.COM (May 14, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://
www.salon.com/opinion/paglia/2008/05/14/tarantella/index.html.
71. Bros Before Hoes Dark T-Shirt, CAFEPRESS SHOP, http://www.cafepress.com/+bros
_before_hoes_dark_tshirt,218487144 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
72. How Do We Beat the Bitch?, CAFEPRESS SHOP, http://shop.cafepress.com/design/
23630617 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
73. Life’s a Bitch Don’t Vote for One—Funny Bumper Stickers, AMAZON ONLINE
STORE, http://www.amazon.com/Lifes-bitch-dont-vote-one/dp/B000ZW27QI (last visited
Jan. 31, 2011).
74. John Horowitz, Clinton Supporters Demand Obama Denounce Ludacris, OBSERVER
.COM (July 30, 2008, 2:37 PM), http://www.observer.com/2008/politics/clinton-supporters
-demand-obama-denounce-ludacris; Some Say Ludacris Song Won’t Damage Obama in
November, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 4, 2008, at B6.
75. Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1996); see also
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that “[a]
female worker need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or harassed by sexual in-
nuendo” in order for a sexual harassment claim to lie and holding that names such as
“bitch,” “slut,” and “cunt” directed to a female employee amount to harassment based on
her sex); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he per-
vasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and addressed
to female employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile environment.”).
76. Sarah Wheaton, ‘Iron my Shirt,’ THE CAUCUS BLOG (Jan. 7, 2008, 7:44 PM),
http://the caucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/iron-my-shirt/.
77. Hillary ‘08 T-Shirts and Clothing, CAFEPRESS SHOP, http://shop.cafepress.com/
design/25416564 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
78. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
79. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004).
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pretext—produce evidence of comments made by a non-decision-
maker or decision-maker unrelated to the employment action, courts
may dismiss such “stray remarks.” 80 Some circuits, however, reject
this “stray remarks” doctrine.81 The Supreme Court, in its Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. decision, suggested that even
where stray remarks are not made in the context of the employment
decision in question, they are still probative in assessing discrimina-
tory animus, potentially supporting a plaintiff’s argument of pretext.82
Blatant and express attitudes about Clinton’s gender played a
role in the 2008 presidential race.83 Contrary to public opinion, how-
ever, gender’s influence by-and-large benefitted Clinton. This is evi-
denced by the results of the twenty-nine primaries for which there
were exit polls, in which a higher percentage of individuals voted for
Clinton in fourteen of those states.84 In those fourteen states, voters
indicated that gender influenced their votes.85 Conversely, Obama
prevailed in only four of the states whose voters indicated that the
candidates’ gender influenced their votes.86 This analysis excludes
Illinois, as this was a predictable win for Obama, and New York and
Arkansas, as predictable wins for Clinton. Interestingly, the four
states in which Obama prevailed were states with a high percentage
of blacks in their populations.87
III. COULD HILLARY CLINTON FILE A SUCCESSFUL TITLE VII CLAIM
FOR IMPLICIT GENDER BIAS?
When people expressly indicate their attitudes, beliefs, and
thought processes, many times they are inaccurate because individ-
80. See McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288,
301 (1st Cir. 1998) (providing two examples of courts declining to give weight to what they
determined to be “stray remarks”); Bright v. Standard Register Co., 66 F.3d 171, 173
(8th Cir. 1995).
81. See Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating that admission of “stray remarks” is permissible in some cases); Fisher v.
Pharmicia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that “stray remarks”
are not irrelevant); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that “stray remarks” are relevant when “it may be possible to infer that decision
makers were influenced” by the remarks) (quoting Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649,
652-53 (7th Cir. 2000)).
82. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 152-53 (2000).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (providing examples of the blatantly
gender-based expressions of anti-Clinton sentiment).
84. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 42-43 (noting that Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and Mississippi
have black populations of thirty percent or more).
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uals sometimes lie when a factual portrayal of their beliefs would be
offensive to others.88 Additionally, more often than not people are
wholly unaware of what lies within their own minds, as “an intuitive,
gut reaction against a candidate can dictate choice. The rational
account only follows later, and provides a fully accurate account of the
decision.” 89 What may explain this is the fact that people rely on par-
allel and distinct cognitive systems.90 Comparatively, they are rapid
versus slow, intuitive versus deductive, and unconscious versus con-
scious.91 Whereas the rapid system dictates choice, for example, the
slow system lags behind, searching for logical reasons for the choice
that at least hints at the accessible parts of memory.92 Voting seems
to fit within this decision-making paradigm, where “intuition and emo-
tion play significant roles in voter choice.” 93 It is no surprise, then,
that political advertisements are designed to manipulate emotionally-
driven decision-making,94 and often have that intended effect.95
A. Implicit Bias: A Definition
Psychology research highlights the influence of unconscious cog-
nitions about gender on judgment and decision-making.96 They operate
outside of an individual’s conscious awareness, are largely uncon-
trollable,97 and may conflict with expressly-held egalitarian values
88. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 40 (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E.
Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and
Behavior, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 118, 121-23, 125, 127 (1978)) (“People’s reports of their cog-
nitive processes are often not consistent with their judgments.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2007)).
92. Id. (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports
about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 118, 125, 127
(1978)).
93. See id. (citing DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN
DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007)) (discussing data from several presidential
campaigns suggesting that voters rely on emotion in making decisions).
94. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 40 (citing Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive
Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005)).
95. Id. (citing William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional
Response to Classify Decided and Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237,
250 (1985); George Marcus & Michael MacKuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The
Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 672, 677-78 (1993)).
96. See Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 24-25 (citations omitted) (reviewing the
research on implicit bias related to gender, and its affect on employment evaluations).
97. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). “The very existence of implicit bias poses
a challenge to legal theory and practice . . . because they can produce behavior that
diverges from person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.” Id.
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or beliefs.98 Furthermore, implicit attitudes may influence evaluations
of others in the voting context.99
Within the social and behavioral sciences, the typical “method of
attitude measurement [has been] the collection of self-reports” that
reflect individuals’ explicit attitudes.100 For example, when research-
ers want to ascertain subjects’ attitudes toward someone or some-
thing, they usually ask participants to select one of several
responses or to use a rating scale.101 The drawback in using these
methods is that sometimes research respondents’ answers to ques-
tions and measures can be highly dependent on the context, e.g.,
who asks and how they ask.102 As such, it is presumed that research
participants are unaware of the relationship between these mea-
sures of automatic attitudes and the attitudes they are employed to
ascertain.103 Indirect measures also seem to minimize respondents’
strategic responding incentives and attitudes.104
One popular measure of automatic attitudes is the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), one of the most widely-used measures of
implicit attitudes and biases.105 The IAT is based on the assumption
that response times will be quicker for categories that are consistent
with individual attitudes.106 For example, to assess implicit gender
attitudes, the IAT pairs male and female names with career and
family words and assesses respondents’ reaction times on association-
matched (e.g., “Sally” and “Children”) and association-unmatched (e.g.,
“Sally” and “Corporation”) pairs.107 The difference in average reaction
times provides a measure of respondents’ association between the two
98. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Age 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 53, 56-57 (2006) (finding that explicit racial bias dissipates with age, while implicit
racial bias remains constant).
99. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 25-27 (citations omitted) (reviewing implicit
bias in relation to prejudice and discrimination).
100. Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz, Introduction to IMPLICIT MEASURES OF
ATTITUDES 1, 1-2 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
101. Id. at 2.
102. SEYMOUR SUDMAN ET AL., THINKING ABOUT ANSWERS: THE APPLICATION OF
COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO SURVEY METHODOLOGY 80 (1995); see ROGER TOURANGEAU ET
AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 197 (2000) (“As survey researchers have dem-
onstrated repeatedly, the same question often produces quite different answers, depending
on the context . . . .”).
103. Wittenbrink & Schwarz, supra note 100, at 3, 8.
104. Id. at 3.
105. See Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 427, 431 (2007) (noting that techniques that assess response times are the most
widely used methods for ascertaining implicit attitudes).
106. Id.
107. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 101,
108-09 (2002).
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pairs of concepts.108 Thus, a person with strong attitudes toward tra-
ditional gender roles would more quickly categorize stimuli consistent
with such attitudes, such as pairing female names with family words
rather than pairing female names with career words.109
B. Implicit Gender Bias, Title VII, and the Clinton Campaign
The American legal system struggles with the distinguishing ex-
plicit from unconscious bias.110 For example, an employer who makes
it clear that he does not believe women are appropriate for a particular
job would easily fall within the law’s prohibition against discrimina-
tion in the workplace.111 Unconscious bias, on the other hand, is more
elusive and difficult to detect.112 Just because an individual holds
automatic gender biases that operate to disadvantage women does
not mean that individual is aware of these biases.113 Even so, there is
a good chance that the same individual might evaluate male job can-
didates more favorably than female job candidates without conscious
awareness of such behavior.114
Linda Hamilton Krieger, in her early assessment of unconscious
bias’s role in employment discrimination, articulated three broad
ideas: (1) stereotyping is a natural phenomena, and what underlies
it is how people categorize and process information;115 (2) people un-
intentionally stereotype out-group members;116 and (3) stereotypes are
automatic, i.e., unconscious.117 In her application of these principles to
employment discrimination law, Krieger made four points. The first
was that Title VII leaves little room for the role of unintentional dis-
crimination,118 but rather requires proof of differential treatment re-
sulting from purposeful or intentional discrimination.119 The second
108. Id. at 104.
109. Id. at 109.
110. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 42 (citations omitted) (“Judges, legislators, and
reformers have long struggled with the difference between explicit and unconscious bias.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 42-43.
114. Id. at 43.
115. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-88
(1995) (citing W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes as Social Concepts, 45 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 229,
229 (1957)).
116. Id. at 1188.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1166-67.
119. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 43 n.337(citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993)) (“[The plaintiff has] the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” (alteration in original)). Few
cases have acknowledged the role of unconscious gender stereotyping. See, e.g., Sweeney
v. Bd. of Trs., 604 F.2d 106, 113 n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming judgment for plaintiff
because the district court reasonably concluded that the decision not to promote her was
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focuses on the assumption that there is a dichotomy of rationality on
one hand and discriminatory intent or motive on the other,120 while
such an assumption makes it difficult to prove intentional employment
discrimination.121 The third focuses on the fact that disparate treat-
ment122 jurisprudence fails to account for the fact that an employer
may be wholly “unaware of the effect of an employee’s [gender] on the
[employer’s] decision making process.”123 Krieger’s fourth and final
point focuses on the assumptions that employers are sufficiently in-
trospective, allowing them to discern the motivations behind their
employment-related decisions, and that non-biased employers comply
with Title VII while biased ones do not.124 In light of data such as this,
at least some courts have begun to consider the role of unconscious
bias in Title VII cases.125
The social scientific literature underscores the reality of uncon-
scious gender bias and stereotyping, showing that people make a host
of automatic assumptions and evaluations of women. For example,
women are automatically perceived as more caring and interdepen-
dent, but less ambitious and competitive than men.126 Women are eval-
uated as less self-reliant and less aggressive than men,127 and status
is less readily misattributed to unknown women than to unknown
men.128 Males are more strongly associated with status and power,129
“determined by a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against women faculty”).
120. Krieger, supra note 115, at 1167 (“[D]isparate treatment analysis assumes that,
unless they harbor discriminatory intent or motive, decisionmakers will act objectively and
judge rationally.”).
121. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that “[p]roof
of such discrimination is always difficult”).
122. In order to prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie
case of discrimination. Texas Dep’t Of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The defendant then
bears the burden of producing a legitimate and nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision
to engage in the action that the plaintiff has identified as discriminatory. St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff can prevail only if it proves that the defendant’s
proffered reason was not the true reason for the decision, but merely “a pretext for
discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254-56.
123. Krieger, supra note 115, at 1167.
124. Id.
125. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 45-46 nn.359-60, 362 (citations omitted)
(reviewing the limited case law).
126. Marianne Schmid Mast, Note, Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An
Implicit Gender Stereotype, 63 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 107, 110 (2004).
127. Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272, 275-76 (1993).
128. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping
in Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86, 189-93 (1996)
(attributing “fame” more strongly to unknown male than to unknown female names).
129. Laurie A. Rudman et al., Implicit Self-Concept and Evaluative Implicit Gender
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and males in leadership roles are evaluated more favorably than their
female counterparts.130 Moreover, attitudes about gender and power
influence career expectancies. For example, men are perceived to be
more closely aligned with science-based careers while women are
more closely aligned with education- or humanities-based careers.131
Based on the results of such psychological research, as well as re-
search demonstrating the influence of unconscious bias on voting,132
it is possible that unconscious bias affected Clinton’s candidacy in
the race for President of the United States. Clinton perceived these
unconscious biases, articulating in her campaign concession speech,
“ ‘like millions of women, I know there are still barriers and biases out
there, often unconscious . . . .’ ”133 She may have been correct, in light
of comments made by media pundits such as Mike Barnicle, Chris
Matthews, John Neffinger, and Mark Rudov. For example, Barnicle
contended that she, “ ‘look[ed] like everyone’s first wife standing out-
side a probate court.’ ”134 Chris Matthews argued that:
The reason she’s a U.S. senator, the reason she’s a candidate for
president, the reason she may be a front-runner is her husband
messed around. That’s how she got to be senator of New York . . . .
She didn’t win there on her merit . . . . She won because everybody
felt, “My God, this woman stood up under humiliation,” right?135
Neffinger stated, “[w]henever she raises her voice, there’s a danger
that she starts to sound a little bit shrill.”136 And Rudov opined,
“[w]hen Barack Obama speaks, men hear, ‘Take off for the future.’
And when Hillary Clinton speaks, men hear, ‘Take out the gar-
bage.’ ”137 Though there is no indication that these commentators
Stereotypes: Self and Ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1164, 1167-68 (2001).
130. Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1319-23.
131. Nosek et al., supra note 107, at 101, 107-08 (2002); Michael J. White & Gwendolen
B. White, Implicit and Explicit Occupational Gender Stereotypes, 55 SEX ROLES 259, 263-
64 (2006).
132. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 25-27.
133. Adam Nagourney & Mark Leibovich, Clinton Ends Campaign with Clear Call
to Elect Obama, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at 1, 31 (quoting Senator Hillary Clinton,
Concession Speech at the 2008 Presidential Democratic Primary (June 7, 2008)).
134. Katharine Q. Seelye & Julie Bosman, Critics and News Executives Split Over
Sexism in Clinton Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, June, 13, 2008, at A1 (quoting Mike Barnicle).
135. Bill Maxwell, Why Hillary Stood by Bill, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 16, 2008, at A08
(quoting Chris Matthews).
136. What’s Been Said About Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A24 (quoting John
Neffinger, Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 16, 2007)).
137. Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News television broadcast Jan. 4, 2008), avail-
able at http://mediamatters.org/research/200801050004.
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harbored any overt sexist attitudes towards or about Clinton, their
stray remarks are probative of their possible implicit unconscious
gender bias.138
The above examples provide some evidence of the implicit biases
about gender that existed during the 2008 presidential campaign.
Contrary to most cases of gender-based stereotyping,139 attitudes to-
wards Clinton were not favorable in content. Although female candi-
dates are typically viewed as more compassionate, honest, warm, and
expressive than men,140 such characteristics were not attributed to
Clinton. Interestingly, however, traditionally male characteristics,
such as competence, decisiveness and strength,141 were also not attrib-
uted to her. Instead, Clinton was challenged to deal with a “dual”
gender bias, i.e., being characterized by unfavorable, stereotypical
female traits, while simultaneously not being characterized by favor-
able, stereotypical male traits.
While the evidence that Clinton’s campaign suffered from im-
plicit gender bias is not robust, there is evidence that such biases may
have been amplified by political conservatism, which has been shown
to be associated with unconscious in-group bias.142 Such effects should
not be surprising given that “[o]ne major criterion continually re-
appears in distinguishing left from right: attitudes toward equality.
The left favours greater equality, while the right sees society as in-
evitably hierarchical.”143 As such, female Democratic candidates fare
better among more liberal voters, and male Democratic candidates
138. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination,
73 MO. L. REV. 83, 96 (2008).
139. John T. Jost & Aaron C. Kay, Exposure to Benevolent Sexism and Complementary
Gender Stereotypes: Consequences for Specific and Diffuse Forms of System Justification,
88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 498, 498 (2005).
140. KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN
CANDIDATES 8 (2004).
141. Id.
142. Cf. William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting
the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1336 (2004)
(examining the relationship between political ideologies and implicit prejudices);
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 958 (charting the difference between implicit
and explicit prejudices); John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory:
Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25
POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 902 (2004) (examining the interaction between group membership
and political ideology to predict implicit and explicit attitudes); Brian Nosek, The Politics
of Intergroup Attitudes, Presentation at Duke University’s The Psychology of Voting
and Election Campaigns (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.electionstudies.org/
conferences/2006Duke/transcripts/Nosek.pdf (arguing that implicit biases are relevant
to political views).
143. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 40
(1998).
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fare better among more conservative voters.144 Thus, one might
predict that Clinton fared much worse than Obama among more
right-leaning Democrats. Here, we use proxies to gauge political
conservatism among Democratic primary voters. Although age,
education, and socioeconomic status have long predicted political
orientation, with those who are older,145 less educated,146 and poorer147
being more politically conservative, statistics from the 2008 presiden-
tial election highlight contrary patterns. Specifically, “those who
voted for Senator Clinton . . . tended to be older, poorer, and less
educated than Senator Obama’s supporters.”148
CODA
Hillary Clinton’s historic campaign not only elevated the issues
of sexism and unconscious gender bias to the national stage, it accom-
plished several other things as well. It opened the door to a compar-
ative look at sexism and unconscious gender bias on one hand and
racism and unconscious race bias on the other. In turn, it also raised
the issue of reverse gender and race discrimination. Furthermore, her
failed bid at the presidency and her inability to shatter this nation’s
highest glass ceiling, likely left open the opportunity for Governor
Sarah Palin to achieve that feat.149 In her effort to do so, Governor
Palin’s (and Senator John McCain’s) campaign cries of sexism150
raises the question of where—on the Left or the Right—the largest
reservoir of sexism resides. Additionally, it begs the question as to the
role of the “gender card” and how it may help or hinder the advance-
ment of women.
144. Monika L. McDermott, Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: Candidate
Gender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary United States Elections, 41 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 270, 278 (1997).
145. Francis D. Glamser, The Importance of Age to Conservative Opinions: A Multivariate
Analysis, 29 J. GERONTOLOGY 549, 551-52 (1974).
146. Id.; Jaime L. Napier & John T. Jost, The “Antidemocratic Personality” Revisited:
A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism, 64 J. SOC. ISSUES
595, 612 (2008).
147. Napier & Jost, supra note 146, at 612.
148. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 34.
149. See, e.g., Rick Klein, Palin on Possible 2012 Run: It Will Be ‘To Win It,’ ABCNEWS
.COM, THE NOTE BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010, 9:52 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2010/11/
palin-on-possible-2012-run-it-will-be-to-win-it.html (noting Palin’s potential 2012 bid for
the presidency).
150. See, e.g., Julie Mason, Palin Cries Sexism, Let’s Review the Evidence, WASH.
EXAMINER, BELTWAY CONFIDENTIAL BLOG (Nov. 17, 2009, 12:28 PM), http://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltway-confidential/Palin-cries-sexism----lets
-review-the-evidence-70285867.html (discussing Palin’s claim that Newsweek’s recent
use of a photo depicting her in running clothes was sexist).
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First, Clinton’s supporters were angry, primarily with the media,
over the pervasive sexism that they saw.151 Even Geraldine Ferraro,
former vice presidential candidate, was convinced that “sexism im-
pacted [Senator] Clinton’s campaign . . . .”152 It is difficult, however,
to discern just how disadvantaged Clinton was because of her sex
without ascertaining just how much she benefited because of her
race. In fact, there is a lingering question that political pundits and
commentators have raised but have been unwilling to tackle: are
Americans “more sexist or more racist?”153 Despite the boldness of
Gloria Steinem’s New York Times op-ed, Women Are Never Front-
Runners, even she was unwilling to tackle the issue despite pronounc-
ing that “[g]ender is probably the most restricting force in American
life . . . .”154 Though sexism and racism are arguably twin halves of
the same oppression,155 they are not the same. In fact, where re-
searchers analyze race/ethnicity and gender together, with particu-
lar regards to stereotyping, race/ethnicity provides more predictive
power.156 Historically, within the domain of politics and the pursuit
of political empowerment, black men gained the right to vote a full
fifty years before women.157 It is doubtful that white men extended
this right to black men because they saw black men as their equals
more so than white women. First, after ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment, southern whites opposed women’s suffrage out of fear
that it would double the number of black voters.158 Second, (white)
women, unlike blacks, did not experience nearly 100 years of efforts
to subvert their right to vote once they obtained it.159 Even in the
151. E. J. Dionne, Jr., ‘Look What They’ve Done to Her,’ WASH. POST, May 30, 2008, at
A13.
152. Geraldine A. Ferraro, Healing the Wounds of Democrats’ Sexism, BOS. GLOBE,
May 30, 2008, at A15.
153. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Americans Are Too Racist for Barack. Americans Are
Too Sexist for Hillary. Discuss, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2006, at B2.
154. Gloria Steinem, Women Are Never Front-Runners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at
A23 (“I’m not advocating a competition for who has it the toughest.”).
155. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-72 (1991) (“Racism and sexism are interlocking, mutually-
reinforcing components of a system of dominance rooted in patriarchy.”).
156. Jeffrey M. Timberlake & Sarah Beth Estes, Do Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes
Depend on the Sex of Target Group Members?: Evidence from a Survey-Based Experiment,
48 SOC. Q. 399, 419-20 (2007).
157. Compare DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 15 (Peter Lang ed., 1998), with STEPHENSON, supra note 10,
at 182, 185 (stating that black men gained the right to vote before women, and describing
the fear white men had that this would lead to female suffrage).
158. STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 122.
159. See HUDSON, supra note 157, at 15 (noting successes of black candidates and the
rapid growth of black voter registration); V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE
AND NATION 555-643 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949) (discussing literacy tests, poll taxes, and
white primaries).
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modern political era, there is no equivalent to the “Bradley Effect”
for women politicians the way there is for black politicians.160 During
the Democratic primaries, with regard to explicit biases, Clinton not
only benefitted from her gender,161 but also from her race.162 In states
where voters indicated that race influenced their voting decisions,
Clinton prevailed in sixteen states, compared to twelve states for
Obama.163 When we subtract those states that Clinton and Obama
would likely have won given their prior affiliations—“Arkansas and
New York for Clinton and Illinois for Obama—Senator Clinton still
benefits.”164 Further, moving to an analysis of unconscious bias, this
benefit is still evident.165 The same proxies used to predict political
conservatism and subsequently unconscious gender bias, also pre-
dict unconscious race bias.166 In essence, some of those who voted for
Clinton found a way to move beyond their unconscious gender bias—
but not their unconscious race bias—to vote for her. The converse can-
not be said to the same degree. This, at least in part, has to do with
the fact that unconscious gender and race bias are different in both
kind and degree. For instance, unconscious race bias functions such
that whites prefer whites over blacks.167 In addition, while individuals
harbor unconscious gender stereotypes,168 women prefer women while
men show no preference either way.169 Comparatively, 71.5% of whites,
67.5% of Asian Americans, and 60.5% of Hispanics have a preference
for whites over blacks.170 Interestingly, researchers Rory McVeigh
and Juliana Sobolewski also discovered that occupational racial and
gender segregation are greater in red (Republican) counties than blue
160. The “Bradley Effect” has come to define black politician electoral losses, or wins
by smaller margins than expected, when wins are expected. See Patrick Reddy, Does
McCall Have a Chance?: Yes, He Does, but Black Candidates for Top State Offices Face
an Uphill Climb, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 20, 2002, at H1 (explaining the origin of the term
and its meaning).
161. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 12-15, 18-19, 39. The Bradley Effect is attrib-
uted to white voters lying to pollsters about who they are likely to vote for in elections
where one candidate is black and the other is white.
162. Id. at 5, 7, 10, 33.
163. Id. at 42-44.
164. Id. at 14.
165. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (stating that both unconscious
race and gender bias can be predicted by political conservatism).
166. Id.
167. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 956.
168. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (stating that individuals harbor
subconscious gender stereotypes).
169. Laurie Rudman & Stephanie A. Goodwin, Gender Differences in Automatic In-
Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More than Men Like Men?, 87 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 494, 497-98 (2004).
170. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 957-58.
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(Democratic) counties,171 which may support the notion that uncon-
scious gender and racial bias increase the further right one goes on
the political spectrum.
Second, in understanding voter support for both Clinton and
Obama, one must acknowledge not only those who would reject them
based on gender or race, but also those who would support them based
on these demographic variables. This allows for an argument of reverse
discrimination. Courts have traditionally found reverse race dis-
crimination actionable under Title VII.172 Some voters’ preference
for Obama based, at least in part, on his race would not likely stand
muster under Title VII, but it illustrates that some Americans are
stretching to reach for an egalitarian racial ideal. Non-white voters’
support for Obama suggests that at least some portion of those who
harbor unconscious racial bias against blacks have moved beyond the
status quo and are actually voting against their own unconscious
race biases. With regard to black voters’ overwhelming support of
Obama,173 their voting behavior can be understood in light of their
unconscious racial biases. Studies indicate that like whites, blacks
demonstrate an alarming degree of anti-black/pro-white implicit bias.
For example, in an Internet-based study, participants expressed a
notable preference for whites over blacks.174 Additionally, by age
thirteen, white children have developed a strong in-group preference
on the IAT, but black children have not.175 Black adults show vari-
ability in implicit racial preferences and overall, blacks show a prefer-
ence for whites over blacks.176 Specifically, about 65% of blacks exhibit
implicit bias in favor of whites.177
Third, Clinton’s campaign also set the stage for two aspects of the
McCain-Palin campaign. At the outset of their campaign, Senator
McCain, Governor Palin and members of their campaign were out-
raged by perceived sexism directed at Palin.178 The irony however,
171. Rory McVeigh & Juliana M. Sobolewski, Red Counties, Blue Counties, and
Occupational Segregation by Sex and Race, 113 AM. J. SOC. 446, 474-78 (2007).
172. Reed v. AirTran Airways, 531 F. Supp. 2d. 660, 668 n.11 (D. Md. 2008).
173. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 20.
174. Kristin A. Lane et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV;
What We Know (So Far) about the Method, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59, 66
(Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
175. Baron & Banaji, supra note 97, at 55.
176. Clarence Vincent Spicer, Effects of Self-Stereotyping and Stereotype Threat on
Intellectual Performance 64 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Kentucky) (on file with William T. Young Library, University of Kentucky).
177. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 957-58; John T. Jost et al., A Decade of
System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious
Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 895 (2004).
178. Ron Fournier, Analysis: McCain Camp Plays Sexism Card for Palin, USA TODAY
Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-09-03-2751994221_x.htm.
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is that political conservatism, vis-à-vis political liberalism, is more
closely aligned with sexism and possibly unconscious gender bias.179
Part of the concern stemmed from pundits and commentators ques-
tioning how Governor Palin would balance motherhood and the Vice
Presidency, which is consistent with social science research sug-
gesting that people discriminate against women based on parental
status180 and these biases may be unconscious.181 Courts have held
that discrimination against employees for having family obligations
is actionable,182 and legal scholars have made the connection be-
tween “family responsibility discrimination” and sex discrimination.183
Gender biases that result from political conservatism, however, were
evident in both Clinton’s and Palin’s campaigns. For example during
a campaign event in South Carolina a voter asked Senator McCain, in
reference to Clinton, “[h]ow do we beat the bitch?”184 Though Senator
McCain did not personally use that language, he failed to challenge
179. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (explaining that liberalism is more
closely aligned with sexism).
180. Research suggests that when women are viewed through the lens of motherhood
and housework, people view them as lacking in confidence and commitment. Studies dem-
onstrate that compared to businesswomen, housewives are rated as low in competence.
Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice,
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 701, 712, 715 (2004); Thomas Ekes, Paternalistic and Envious
Gender Stereotypes: Testing Predictions from the Stereotype Content Model, 47 SEX
ROLES 99, 102 (2002); Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content:
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition,
82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 880, 882, 887, 892, 897 (2002); Peter Glick &
Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as Complementary
Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 111-13 (2001).
181. See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science
to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 402-04, 439-40 (2003) (finding that it is assumed that women
cannot adequately balance being a good mother and good employee).
182. See Gallina v. Mintz, 123 F. App’x 558, 560, 563 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
employer discriminated against an employee for being a mother); Knussman v. Maryland,
272 F.3d 625, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the employer discriminated against a
male employee where it denied the plaintiff leave to care for his daughter); Sheehan v.
Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1042-43, 1045 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an employer
discriminated against an employee for needing to spend time with her children).
183. Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Respon-
sibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1285-86,
1289-92, 1296 (2008) (citations omitted); Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the
Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1362, 1382 (2008); David L. Faigman et al.,
A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1389, 1391, 1396, 1398-99 (2008); see Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The
Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the
Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1313 (2008) (discussing
employment discrimination based on family obligation).
184. Steve Chapman, To McCain, the Truth Is Expendable, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 2008,
at 7.
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it,185 and courts have found such language probative in analyzing
claims of sex discrimination in the workplace.186 In addition to such
sexist language associated with Senator McCain and his campaign, it
is important to examine his behavior toward Governor Palin. Critics
blasted his campaign for sequestering his running mate, and attributed
his paternalistic behavior as sexist.187 Courts have similarly found
that gender paternalism is inconsistent with anti-discrimination
laws.188
Finally, critics accused the McCain-Palin campaign of demon-
strating faux outrage at alleged slights toward Governor Palin.189 In
fact, some critics went so far as to charge the McCain campaign with
using “sexism” as a political talisman to ward off media analysis of
Governor Palin, and to blunt any critique lodged by the Obama cam-
paign that could loosely be tied to Governor Palin.190 If this critique
was accurate, the McCain campaign did a tremendous disservice to
women because, when “warnings are provided too often, their infor-
mation content becomes even lower and frequent false alarms render
them ineffective because of the ‘cry-wolf’ effect.”191 Under Title VII,
courts are critical of plaintiffs who have a “proven tendency to cry
‘wolf ’ . . . when no wolf is about . . . .”192 Generally, bias reduction
through interpersonal confrontation has the effect of inducing irri-
tation and anger toward the confronter.193 In essence, individuals may
be shamed, not only into guilt, but also into anger and aggression.194
185. Id.
186. See cases cited supra note 75 (stating that comments such as, “[h]ow do we beat
the bitch” are probative in sex discrimination cases in the employment context).
187. Katharine Q. Seelye, Seeking Sarah Palin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at 24.
188. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prod., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 342-43 n.6 (4th Cir. 2003) (“I reject
the notion that female workers are in need of ‘the protection of a preferential standard.’ ”)
(quoting DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995));
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich. 1993) (“The belief that women are . . . in
need of a more protective standard . . . degrades women and is repugnant to the very ideals
of equality that [employment discrimination law] is intended to protect.”).
189. See Chapman, supra note 183 (contending that McCain’s campaign lied when it
claimed sexism “when [Senator] Obama scoffed at the idea that the GOP ticket offered real
change from President Bush, saying, ‘You can put lipstick on a pig—it’s still a pig’ ”).
190. Fournier, supra note 178.
191. Jason D. Papastavrou & Mark R. Lehto, Improving the Effectiveness of Warnings
by Increasing the Appropriateness of their Information Content: Some Hypotheses About
Human Compliance, 21 SAFETY SCI. 175, 175 (1996) (discussing how abusing the “race
card” causes a lack of believability in discrimination complaints).
192. McDowell v. Moore, 635 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (granting the
defendants attorney’s fees in a Title VII action due to frivolity of the plaintiff’s complaint).
193. Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing Up for a Change: Reducing Bias Through
Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784, 786-87, 791 (2006)
(explaining that bias reduction can induce irritation and anger towards the confronter).
194. June Price Tangney et al., Shamed into Anger?: The Relation of Shame and Guilt
to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669, 670
(1992).
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This is particularly so when racism is at issue and not so much with
regards to sexism.195 Nonetheless, the more the “gender card” is
played, whether in the domain of politics or employment, the more
insulting it will be to accused but guiltless individuals, and the less
effective legitimate cries of sexism will become.196
CONCLUSION
Overall, the 2008 presidential election represents an interest-
ing context in which to explore issues of sexism and gender bias, em-
ployment discrimination, and the intersection of gender and race in
employment outcomes. Further, at the center of it all stood Senator
Hillary Clinton, who navigated the peaks and pitfalls resulting from
the American public’s gender-related opinions, attitudes and voting be-
havior. While her 2008 bid for the U.S. presidency was not successful,
her candidacy provides an opportunity for interrogation about the
role of gender in American life and in the law. Further, it reveals
the palpability of such biases within political contexts.
195. See Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally):
Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 532, 536-37 (2003) (showing that more individuals are shamed by guilt, anger, and
aggression when dealing with racism than with sexism).
196. See Papastavrou & Lehto, supra note 191, at 175 (explaining the danger of the “cry
wolf” effect); see also McDowell, 635 F. Supp. at 283 (noting that the more the “gender
card” is used, the less effective and legitimate it becomes).
